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1 Introduction
Network e¤ects arise when the utility derived from the consumption of a good depends on the
number of people using it. Most common examples are phone lines and fax machines. A phone
line is of no use unless others are also connected to the network. Indirect network e¤ects arise
when the benet of using a product is increasing in the use of a complementary set of goods.
Typical examples of products exhibiting indirect network e¤ects are computers (complementary
with software applications) and CD-players (complementary with CDs).
In the last few years, the Industrial Organization literature has increasingly explored indirect
network e¤ects. The theory of network e¤ects has wide applicability. Indeed, it is of fundamental
importance for competition and regulation policies, business strategies, intellectual property rights,
and technical change in a wide range of industries; from hi-tech ones such as IT industries (Gandal
1994) to traditional ones such as the yellow pages industry (Rysman 2004). Developments in
these industries cannot be fully analyzed without an understanding of the network e¤ects. Equally
important is the fact that indirect network e¤ects, under very general conditions, will give rise
to network externalities (Church, Gandal, and Krause 2002).1 The externality occurs when the
private benet of the marginal hardware purchaser is less than the social benet. The marginal
hardware purchaser does not internalize the welfare improving response of the software industry,
where an increase in software variety will benet the inframarginal users.
Indirect network externalities create a two-way contingency between the hardware demand and
the software supply. In this paper we develop a model that captures the interdependence between
hardware demand and software supply in a di¤erentiated goods market. Specically, we apply this
model to the U.S. Digital Video Disc (DVD) player market using price and sales data on DVD
players and DVD titles. We assume that the utility a consumer receives from owning a DVD player
increases in the number of movie titles that are available in the DVD format. In return, an increase
in the number of DVD players leads to a greater demand for movies on DVD, thus completing
the cycle. The conditions under which an indirect network e¤ect leads to a network externality
are arguably satised in this case.2 We use data on hardware sales and software availability to
1Church, Gandal, and Krause (2002) show that indirect network e¤ects lead to externatility when there are 1)
increasing returns to scale in the production of software; 2) free entry into software market; 3) consumer preferences
for the variety, not just the number, of software.
2Production of software involves very high xed costs and a constant (and very low) marginal cost; thus increasing
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measure the size of the network e¤ect in the DVD player market. The data set used in this study
is unique; we have close to complete coverage of the hardware market with detailed information
on each separate product.3 Additionally, we observe all movies released on DVD along with their
features. This extra information proves to be essential for obtaining an unbiased estimate of the
network e¤ect.
Since hardware prices decline and software availability increases steadily over time, it is di¢ cult
to identify the e¤ect of increased software availability on hardware adoption using time series data
alone. The main source of the identication of the network e¤ect comes from the di¤erences in the
availability of new titles on two di¤erent formats: VHS and DVD. Until very recently the number
of new titles released was greater for the VHS format than for DVD.4 Di¤erences in software
availability and the resulting di¤erences in adoption rates allow us to estimate the network e¤ect.
The ability to measure network e¤ects is crucial to rms competing in these industries. It is also
important from a social welfare point of view. Under certain conditions, the good or service exhibit-
ing network e¤ects will be under-provided or under-consumed, leading to market ine¢ ciency. In
the context of inter-dependence, integration of hardware and software industries, or price coordina-
tion among hardware rms could be socially desirable if the integrated body is able to internalize
the network externality. In order to be able to analyze all these issues we construct a discrete
choice model of a di¤erentiated products market, with an explicit structure of hardware demand
and software supply. The demand for a DVD player is a function of player price and characteris-
tics and of DVD title availability. Supply of software depends on the hardware installed base and
characteristics of movies.
Our results point to the existence of considerable network e¤ects in the DVD market. A 1%
increase in the number of DVD titles raises the demand for DVD players by 0.87%. On the other
hand, a 1% increase in hardware installed base leads to a 0.16% increase in the number of titles
released on DVD. Using our parameter estimates, we simulate the impact of cooperation among
DVD player manufacturers aimed at internalizing the network externality. Our simulations provide
returns to scale in software production is to be expected. It is also safe to assume that consumer tastes for movies
are heterogenous. As for free entry into the movie production industry, many books and articles have been describing
how small companies could succesfully enter the movie production market. See, for example, Vogel(1998).
3Our data covers more than 80% of total retail sales of DVD player in the U.S. See section 3.1.
4By titleswe mean movies produced for theatrical and/or home-video screening. Today, all new movies that
appear in the video rental market are released in both formats. But since VHS is a much older product, the
accumulated number of VHS titles surpasses that of DVD titles by far.
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mixed results. A price cut by a single manufacturer increases total industry revenues whereas an
overall reduction in prices leads to a fall in industry revenues. These ndings suggest that an
integrated body of hardware manufacturers might not be able to exploit the network e¤ect in order
to raise their current and future gains.
The endogeneity of software availability complicates the estimation of hardware demand. Any
unobserved factor that makes DVD a more popular product will lead to greater hardware sales
and increased software availability. To correct this endogeneity problem we use an instrumental-
variables approach. Instruments that are not correlated with hardware demand but are correlated
with software supply are needed. We believe that the characteristics of titles that are released at
the box o¢ ce and on VHS make good instruments.
The next section reviews the related literature. Section 3 outlines the evolution of the DVD
format and describes the hardware and software sides of the market. The data used in this study
is also summarized in section 3. In section 4, we outline the estimation methodology and address
some econometric issues. Section 5 provides the estimation results. We then experiment with a
counterfactual exercise to predict the potential value of consolidation to hardware rms. The last
section concludes our ndings.
2 Related Literature
Starting in the 1980s, a small group of economists began to show interest in markets with network
externalities. Initially, the focus of these mostly theoretical studies was on direct network exter-
nalities. Katz and Shapiro (1985) develop an oligopoly model to analyze a market with network
e¤ects. Farrel and Saloner (1985) focus on the role of rms as these decide sequentially whether
to adopt a new technology (network). In the early nineties Chou and Shy (1990) and Church and
Gandal (1992) extended the analysis to markets of complementary products.
Empirical studies on the subject started to appear since the mid 90s. A few of these have
investigated the existence of direct network e¤ects (Gandal (1994), Gowrisankaran and Stavins
(2002), Damar (2006) among others). Gandal, Kende, and Rob (2000) is the rst to investigate
empirically the complementaries between hardware and software products. They use aggregate level
data in the estimation of a dynamic model of the CD player industry. Similarly, Karaca-Mandic
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(2003) uses household level data on DVD player ownership to identify indirect network e¤ects in the
DVD market. Her model takes into account the fact that consumers are forward looking and may
opt to delay their purchasing decisions in order to benet from lower future prices and increased
software availability. However, she makes the assumption that all DVD players are identical and
hence consumers only decide when to buy a player.
Some of the previous studies deal with network e¤ects by using models which allow for di¤eren-
tiated products. Ohashi (2003) and Park (2004) contruct a discrete choice model for di¤erentiated
products and estimate the size of network e¤ects in the U.S. VCR market. But their analyses
both su¤er from the lack of information on software availability which is instead approximated by
the lagged installed base of VCRs. Nair, Chintagunta, and Dube (2004) analyze the market for
Personal Digital Assistants (PDA) and show the existence of strong network e¤ects. Although the
methodology of their paper is similar to ours, the validity of using hardware characteristics as in-
struments for the software variety is questionable. We believe that we construct better instruments
thanks to the availability of detailed data on our software variables.
Our paper is similar to all of these in that it tries to identify network e¤ects in a new consumer
electronics industry based on static, di¤erentiated products model. Static models have well-known
limitations in estimating demand for durable goods. The problem might be even more severe in
the analysis of a newly introduced product like the DVD. Despite this fact, there has been only a
few attempts (see Melnikov (2001)) that incorporate dynamic demand into a discrete choice model.
To our knowledge there has been no success in estimating demand and supply simultaneously
in a dynamic model. Some of previous studies on durable good markets sacrice dynamics to
take into account di¤erentiated products and incomplete competition (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes(1995)). While adopting a static discrete choice model of demand, our paper is superior
as it uses a more convincing identication strategy (we have a more elaborate description of the
software side with full information on software availability, including the characteristics). We follow
Gandal, Kende and Rob (2000) in exploiting exogenous variation in the complementary market to
form instruments for the network e¤ect. We di¤er from them in that we have more detailed data
on sales of individual models, which allows us to apply the identication strategy to an oligopoly
model.
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3 The U.S. DVD Industry
3.1 Hardware
In April 1997, the Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) was introduced by a consortium of hardware makers
and motion picture studios as an a¤ordable, yet markedly superior, replacement for videotapes. At
the time of the introduction of the rst DVD player, there were only 40 movie titles available
as studios were reluctant to enter the market. Early sales of DVD players exceeded expectations
and, after a brief standards war that resulted in the clear victory of the DVD, sales reached
unprecedented levels. As a result, the DVD player became the fastest growing electronics product.
In 2001, monthly shipments of DVD players surpassed those of videocassette recorders (VCRs). In
2007, 21 million DVD players were shipped to dealers across the U.S. Today, DVD players outsell
VCRs 40 to 1. Figures 1 and 2 depict the evolution of sales and prices for the two formats between
1997 and 2004.
The radical expansion of the format was partly stimulated by a continuous decline in hardware
prices. The average price of a DVD player fell from $491 in 1997 to $118 in 20035. Strikingly,
during this period the average quality steadily increased as hardware manufacturers added new
features to their products. The fall in prices is, in part, due to the entry of a signicant number of
low-cost manufacturers such as Apex Digital Inc. which, established by the end of 1999, possesses
the largest market share in units sold today. The number of manufacturers increased from 16 in
1997 to 51 in 2003.
3.2 Software
The rst feature lms on DVD appeared in Japan in December 1996 (The Assassin, Blade Runner,
Eraser, and The Fugitive from Warner Home Video).6 In the U.S. Warner Brothers US launched
DVD titles on March 24, 1997, but the launch was limited to seven cities. Nevertheless, almost
19,000 discs were purchased in the rst two weeks of the U.S. launch, a number much greater than
that expected by the studio. By December 1997, over 1 million DVD discs were shipped while
the number of titles climbed up to 530. Today, all movies that appear in theaters are released on
5 In 2007, the average price of a DVD player was $72 (Entertainment Industry Market Statistics, 2007).
6The chronology of the DVD industry, especially the software side history, is taken from Taylor (2000). Also see
the webpage version (www.dvddemystied.com/dvdfaq.html) for comprehensive information on the DVD format.
6
DVD as well as on VHS. By the end of 2002 there were about 23,000 titles available in the U.S.
Due to the late response from the video rental market it was September, 1999 when Blockbuster
began DVD rentals in 500 stores growth of DVD rentals was slower compared to the growth of
sell-through sales. However, the rental market transited quickly to the DVD, and DVD rentals
outpaced videocassette rentals by June 2003.7 By 2007, videocassette rentals were reduced to
almost zero. Figure 3 depicts the number of available titles for both formats between 1997 ad 2004.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Hardware Data
The structural estimation of the model necessitates the use of product level sales and price data,
and information on the characteristics of DVD players. Our data source comes from point-of sale
scanner data through retail channels which cover more than 80% of total sales in the U.S. This
unusually rich data set covers the time span from the introduction of the format in April 1997 until
August 2003. From this data set we generated aggregate price and sales series for DVD players,
as well as product level variables. The characteristics data were manually collected from public
sources such as retailerswebsites. Summary statistics and the descriptions of the characteristics
can be found in table A.1 in the appendix.
We obtained total weekly sales of VCR decks from various trade magazines. We have only
annual average prices of VCRs. Since the VCR market is saturated, we interpolated monthly
prices, assuming that prices change at a constant rate over time.
3.3.2 Titles Data
We employ two di¤erent data sets on software availability. The DVD titles data are obtained from
the DVD Entertainment Group (DEG). The data set includes all DVD titles including music videos.
It has detailed information on features such as release date, genre, and MPAA rating. In our data
period, on average about 60 new titles were released per month. The data are available on the
DEG website.8
We obtained monthly data on VHS titles from the Video Software Dealers Association (VSDA).
7The Washington Times, June 21, 2003
8http://www.dvdinformation.com/titles/index.html
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VSDA has the archives of VHS titles that are released since September 1998. The number of VHS
titles at the time of the introduction of the DVD format (April 1997) is not available, but as of
October 2003 one can search from 33,000 titles on retailers such as Amazon.com. According to the
VSDA data, on average, about 60 new VHS titles come out per month. Relying on the fact that
VHS was a mature and established format by 1997 we linearly extrapolated VHS title data from
April 1997 to September 1998. Original data from VSDA are used for the remainder of the data
range.
Our main software variety variable (MOVIES) includes only theatrical movies which are pro-
duced since 1996 and released in home video. This variable is our measure of software availability.
The titles are comparable across the VHS and the DVD formats and there is complete information
on their attributes. We do not observe rental or sales prices of DVD titles but this should not pose
a problem since both rental and sales prices of DVDs have remained relatively steady. Changes in
DVD prices cannot explain uctuations in DVD player sales.
4 Identication of the network e¤ects
4.1 Hardware Demand: Nested Logit Model
The simplest structure in which we can possibly describe the decision process of a consumer and
identify the network e¤ects is one that presents a choice between a VCR, a DVD player, and the
no-purchase outside option in an upper nest and the choice of individual products in a lower nest.
According to this nest structure, consumers rst choose between buying a VCR, a DVD player, or
no video product at all. If they choose to buy a DVD player, then they decide on a specic model
in the lower nest. Note that over 90% of households had a VCR at the outset of DVD launch,
and therefore most of VCR purchase must have been for replacement. However, the fact that the
outside option includes a choice to keep and enjoy the old VCR machine would not cause a serious
problem to the estimation strategy because the value of the outside option is normalized and the
utilities from the other options are measured in relative terms.9
The necessary variation for the identication of the network e¤ect is observed in the upper nest.
We expect DVD player sales to grow relatively fast as the number of DVD titles increases. The
9Note that consumer choice is not an ownership decision ("what to use") but a purchasing decision ("what to
buy").
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parameters on the characteristics of DVD players are identied in the lower nest. Owing to the
absence of product level data, we have to make a homogeneous good assumption for VCRs. In the
year 2000, a new product, the DVD-VCR combo player, has been introduced into the consumer
electronics market. The combo player has two di¤erent decks which can respectively play DVD
and VHS titles. The fact that the utility from a combo player depends on both the stock of VHS
and DVD titles gives rise to a subtle problem in the identication of network e¤ects. Therefore, we
omit DVD-VCR combos from our sample.
The utility a representative consumer receives from purchasing a VCR or a DVD player is
Uijft = Xjt + Pjt + f(Nft) + jt + ft + ift + "ijt (1)
where the subscript f 2 (d; v; o) stands for the two video formats and the outside option, j for
the jth product (let j = 0 for the outside option and j = 1 for VCR), and t for the time period.
A consumer gets utility from product specic characteristics Xjt and (negatively) from the price
of the product Pjt. A video player, however, does not give any utility without titles that it can
play. Therefore utility also depends on a function of the number of titles in each format f , at
time t, f(Nft). Econometricians often do not observe all product attributes that consumers care
about, and to this end include error terms to capture their e¤ect on utility. The rst two of these
terms, jt and ft are unidimensional unobserved characteristics that represent the mean utility
from a product and from a format, respectively. The latter two are idiosyncratic error terms.
Heterogeneity of preference on a format is captured by ift. Similarly, the last term "ijt represents
the deviation from the mean of a consumers preference for a product. To complete the nested logit
structure we assume that (ift+ "ijt) has a type I Extreme Value distribution with scale parameter
. Under this formulation the probability of choosing one model takes the well-known logit form.
We acknowledge the possible endogeneity of f(Nft) resulting from the two-way interaction
between hardware and software (formally E(iftjNft) 6= 0). There might be unobserved attributes
of format f such as an unobserved taste for the specic technology, which are correlated with the
software availability variable. There is also reason to believe that Pjt might be endogenous. A
product with superior unobserved features, jt; is more likely to have a higher price and provide a
higher utility at the same time. This correlation between unobserved product attributes and price
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leads to an upward bias of the price coe¢ cient. The within-nest share may be endogenous for the
same reason.
To take into account the possible endogeneity of prices and the number of titles, we transform
market shares into a linear combination of observed variables and unobserved variables following
Berry (1994). By normalizing the utility from the outside option to be Ui0t = i0t + "i0t = 0, we
get
ln sjt   ln s0t = Xjt + Pjt + 1f(Nft) + (1  ) ln sjftjBf + jt + ft (2)
where sjftjBf is the within group market share of product j that belongs to set Bf . We estimate
the equation (2) by OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) method to get the parameters of utility
function.
4.2 Software Provision: Aggregate Level Estimation
A reduced-form equation is used to estimate the magnitude of the network e¤ects in the other
direction: the impact of the change in the installed base of players on the variety of titles.10
Specically, the estimation equation for aggregate software is
lnNt = + 2 ln
Pt
=1 S + vt (3)
where the unit of time is a month, Nt is the total number of DVD title releases as dened above and
S is the monthly sales of DVD players. The sum of the monthly sales,
Pt
=1 S is the cumulative
player sales or the installed base of DVD players. Note that price is missing in the software supply
equation because we dont observe prices (rental or sales) of titles. We rationalize this specication
by assuming that the price-cost margin remains constant across titles and time.
Our rst concern is on the stationarity of our aggregate variables. Equation (3) is potentially
a spurious regression equation, if the dependent and independent variables have common upward
trends or unit root. In that case, we are very likely to nd a signicant coe¢ cient for ln
Pt
=1 S ,
even if there is no actual relationship. In this respect, aggregate variables in the model (3) are
tested for stationarity and the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected.
10Nair, Chintagunta, and Dubé(2004) derive a similar equation by solving for a symmetric price equilibrium under
a zero prot condition.
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The second concern is on the possible serial correlation of the independent variables with the
error term. As Gandal, Kende and Rob(2000) suggest, we include lagged dependent variables in the
regression equation to deal with this problem. An additional advantage of having lagged dependent
variables is that they help us capture direct e¤ects or knowledge spillover by controlling for
previous periodsvolume of sales.
4.3 Instruments
If one is only interested in parameters  and , (1f(Nft) + ft) together can be treated as a
group xed e¤ect that can be eliminated. However, since our main interest is to estimate , this
approach cannot be taken and therefore we need to instrument for Nft. As instruments, we use the
characteristics of theatrical and VHS movies which are ready to be released on DVD. We believe
that there is a relationship between certain characteristics of movies and the probability they will be
released on DVD. For instance, action/adventure movies and blockbuster movies are more likely to
be released on DVD, probably because DVDs contain special features such as behind the scenes,
interactive games, and bonus cuts, which are valued more by fans of these types of movies. If indeed
there exists a relationship, then we can use, for example, the ratio of action movies among all DVD
candidate movies as an instrument for software availability. The decision to make a certain movie is
usually made with a focus on theatrical revenue and long before video release, and therefore should
not depend on the demand for DVD players.
We have run a probit regression to see if certain characteristics of movies are indeed related
to the probability of DVD release. The results of this estimation verify that there is in fact a
relationship between some movie characteristics and the likelihood of a DVD release. First, high
budget movies are more likely to be released on DVD. The budget of a movie instead of box o¢ ce
score is used as a proxy for being a blockbuster movie since the box o¢ ce score occasionally includes
revenues from video sales and hence is clearly correlated with the error term. Second, we observe
that some genres are favored by studios. Action/Adventure movies are more likely to be released
on DVD whereas horror and thriller movies seem to have a lower demand as DVD titles.11
Valid instruments for prices are functions of the characteristics of other products since the
hardware attributes are assumed to be exogenous and the existence of similar products likely keeps
11The results of the probit estimation are available from the authors upon request.
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the price down. The sums of the characteristics of all DVD player models and the number of models
are chosen as instruments for the within-nest share.12
There also might be the possible endogeneity of
Pt
=1 S in the aggregate level estimation (3)
since the variety of software and the sales of hardware are simultaneously determined. We use
the sum of hardware characteristics as an instrument for the installed base in the software supply
equation.
5 Results and Implications
5.1 DVD Player Demand
The results from the estimation of the product level nested logit model, which is given by equation
(2), are presented below in table 5.1. The number of U.S. households is chosen as the size of the
potential market for DVD players and VCRs. The market size in the rst period, M0, is set at 100
million. Consumers are assumed to exit the market once they buy a VCR or a DVD player. Thus,
the market size at period t is Mt = M0  
Pt
=1 [Salest(V CR) + Salest(DVD)]. This assumption
of market exit captures some dynamic aspects of the problem. Under the assumption, consumers
who choose not to buy a new video product become potential buyers in the next period. Hence,
we can treat their behavior of no purchase as of waiting.
The rst column reports the results from the base OLS estimation of equation (2). Most of
the coe¢ cients have the expected signs. Greater variety of titles has a positive e¤ect on consumer
utility and hence on hardware demand. The OLS regression results suggest that a 1% increase in
the number of movies released on DVD raises the market share of a DVD player model relative to
no-purchase option by 1.23%. We include dummies for the months of November and December in
order to capture the "Christmas e¤ect" - the seasonality that is observed from the data as shown
in Figure 1. The positive and highly signicant seasonal dummy variable (SEASON) suggests a
strong Christmas e¤ect. The large coe¢ cient on the within-nest share (WITHIN) tells us that
nesting products into categories of VCR and DVD is indeed meaningful. A DVD player model is
closer substitute for other DVD player models than a VCR. The coe¢ cients on video (component)
12We believe that changes in hardware characteristics are technology (and cost) driven. Therefore they should
better reect di¤erences in DVD player prices than changes in DVD popularity.
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and audio outputs (optical, coaxial) are not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Also coe¢ cients on
digital audio decoders (dolby-digital and DTS) are either negative or insignicant. The results may
suggest that consumers do not give much value to those features when they choose a DVD player
either because they are not informed about these attributes, or because those attributes do not
increase quality signicantly.
The results from the IV regressions are reported in the last two columns. Initially, only hardware
characteristics are used as instruments. The results indicate that the OLS estimates for price,
software variety, and the within-group share are upward biased. After applying the instruments,
the coe¢ cients become smaller in magnitude but the signs do not change. When we included
software side instrumental variables (such as the cumulative number of movies in each genre and
rating), we estimated even smaller but still signicant coe¢ cients. The e¤ect of software availability
on hardware demand is 0.87 and is still signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The results of the rst-stage regressions indicate that the instruments are highly correlated with
the endogenous variables. Furthermore, a Hausman exogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis that
the di¤erences between the OLS and IV estimates are non-signicant13.
In the above regressions we use a logarithmic software benet function, log(Nt). We also
experimented with alternative software availability variables and di¤erent functional specications.
One noteworthy result is that with a quadratic specication for DVD movie titles,.while we continue
to nd a positive impact of variety on consumer utility we also observe that the marginal e¤ect of
an increase in titles diminishes.14
One can use the estimated coe¢ cients to calculate own and cross-price elasticities for individual
models. Table 5.2 presents the own and cross-price elasticities for two popular models of two of the
leading DVD player brands (Sony and Panasonic) and the generic VCR model. We use the demand
estimates and the mean values of the price and quantity variables to calculate the elasticities. Not
surprisingly, the generic VCR model has a lower own price elasticity than both DVD player models.
The main reason for a consumer to choose a VCR rather than a DVD player should be the much
greater availability of titles for this format. Only 7% of the models in our dataset turn out to have
lower own price elasticities than the VCR.
13Results of the rst-stage regressions are available upon request from the authors.
14Ohashi (2003) estimates network e¤ects in the U.S. VCR market. His point estimates range from 0.63 to 1.45.
Nair et. al. (2004) estimate network e¤ects in the U.S. PDA market. Their point estimates range from 0.90 to 1.08.
It is safe to conclude that our results are in line with theirs.
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5.2 Software Supply
Table 5.3 shows the estimation results from the software supply equation. The rst column corre-
sponds to the OLS regression with the installed base as an explanatory variable. The coe¢ cients
on the installed base show yet another direction of the network e¤ect. Averages of several hard-
ware characteristics are used as instruments for player sales in the IV regressions and the results
are shown in the second column. Instrumenting lowers the magnitude of the coe¢ cients since it
removes the upward bias in the estimates. As player sales increase by 1%, about 0.14% more titles
are provided. For all specications the reported standard errors are robust to unknown serial cor-
relation of the errors.15 The Durbin-Watson test statistic for autocorrelation after including AR(1)
term are all within a band where we can say that there is no serious autocorrelation of errors.
5.3 The Role of Network E¤ects on the di¤usion of DVD
Using equation (2), we can decompose the di¤erence between the (log) share of total DVD sales and
that of VCRs into two factors: the di¤erence in the variety of software titles, and the di¤erences
in hardware attributes.
ln sd   ln sv = (1  )
24lnX
j2d
ej=   ln
X
j2v
ej=
35+  [lnNd   lnNv]
where d and v denote DVD and VCR, respectively. Based on this decomposition, the role of network
e¤ects on the di¤usion of DVD can be calculated as16
 [lnNd   lnNv]
ln sd   ln sv
We have calculated this ratio for each month from April 1997, an introductory period for the
DVD format, to December 2000. On average, during this period about 29% of the ratio of DVD
player to VCR sales is explained by network e¤ects. One can also see that the role of the network
e¤ects has been shrinking over time. This nding is consistent with the regression result that
included a quadratic network e¤ect specication and indicated a decreasing marginal e¤ect.
15We report Newey-West and Kernel-based autocorrelation consistent (AC) standard errors.
16See Ohashi(2003) for more about the decomposition
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5.4 Simulation
As stated earlier, an integrated body of hardware rms may be able to internalize the network
externality in a way a single rm can not. A single hardware producer among many will not nd
it protable to lower the price of one its products in order to exploit the network e¤ect. On the
other hand, for an integrated hardware body that produces all of the models in the industry the
potential gain of a price reduction might be much larger. In this section we simulate the e¤ect of
a one period change in the price of some products while holding all the other prices constant. We
compute the change in revenues for the chosen products, the rm producing the products, and the
whole industry.17
When a rm lowers the price of its product, there are two e¤ects at play. First, some consumers
who already decided to buy a DVD player switch from other models to the one with the reduced
price. We call this the business stealinge¤ect. Second, some other consumers who were not going
to buy any DVD player now nd it optimal to buy the cheaper model. These purchases put the
network e¤ect into action. An increase in the installed base of DVD players induces studios to
release more movies on DVD. As software variety expands, DVD players become more popular
and sales of all models increase. We call this second e¤ect the market expansione¤ect. A single
hardware rm does not have as much incentive to lower the price of its product because it will not
be able to fully internalize this market expansion e¤ect.
Our counterfactual experiment runs as follows: We perturb the equilibrium set of prices by
lowering the prices of all DVD players of a single brand for just one period, holding all other prices
constant. Using our results from sections 5.1 and 5.2, we simulate a change in software availability
and the resulting increase in the demand for DVD players. Then, we investigate the change in
revenue of the single rm and that of the whole industry.
Figure 4 shows the change in total industry revenue following a 10% reduction in the prices
of all models of a rm18. The horizontal axis shows the timing of the price cut. When a rm
lowers its prices at the 10th period (January 1998), then the total industry revenue would increase
by $1,268,100. Initially, revenues can shrink due to weak business stealing e¤ects or a low price
17We deliberately avoid mentioning prots since calculating the change in prots would require us to have marginal
cost information.
18Here we chose SONY as the price cutting brand. Experimenting with other major brands did not lead to
signicantly di¤erent results.
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elasticity of demand. Later, network e¤ects generate increased revenues for the industry. Greater
sales of players in the period with the price-cut induces more provision of DVD titles, and more
DVD titles lead to increased DVD player purchases. Overall, change in industry revenue could be
negative when network e¤ects become e¤ective too late to recoup the losses incurred in the early
periods. The cyclical uctuations in revenues are due to seasonal e¤ects.
Looking at the simulation results one might wonder why none of the rms followed such a
strategy instead of committing to the observed path. One explanation is that a rm might be
afraid of initiating a price war. In our experiment we do not allow the other rms in the market
to respond to the simulated price cut. In reality, a rm expects its rivals to react to a change in
its policy. The results of this experiment suggest that, in theory, all rms in the industry might
benet from such a perturbation in prices under certain revenue allocation schemes.
On the other hand, consumer surplus increases as consumers enjoy increased software availability
as well as the temporary drop in prices. We nd that the surplus of the representative consumer
rises by c/6.4 over the whole period when the price cut occurs at the 10th period. This gure
translates to approximately a $640,000 gain for all households in the U.S.
As noted earlier, a consortium called the DVD Forum was founded to faciliate the development
of a single DVD standard. This kind of a voluntarystandardization brings about several economic
benets including dissemination of information, reduction of unnecessary variety, and compatibility
(Lecraw, 1984). Our simple experiment points towards a possible gain in e¢ ciency resulting from
price coordination. This conrms our belief that hardware rms can do better by making joint
pricing decisions in order to exploit the network e¤ects. Economists are usually skeptical about
any form of integration since these lead to increased market concentration. Under network e¤ects,
however, consumers may benet from the increased availability of software.
One should be careful in drawing any conclusion from our simulation. We assume that in our
simulation, all decision variables except the prices of certain products stay constant. But in reality,
a single rms decisions a¤ect the behavior of other rms. A change in market structure also incurs
changes in rmsstrategies on price, quality, and product line that would twist the nal e¤ect of a
price-cut under network e¤ects.
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6 Conclusion
Indirect network e¤ects arise when the benet of a product is increasing in the use of a complemen-
tary set of goods. For instance, the utility one gets from owning a DVD player (hardware) increases
in the number of titles that are available on DVD (software). At the same time demand for software
depends on the number of users of the hardware. In this paper we estimate the complementarity
between hardware and software in the U.S. DVD market using data on hardware sales and title
availability.
We estimate a nested-logit model at the level of the individual product. The identication of
the network e¤ect comes from the di¤erences in software availability between two di¤erent systems:
VHS and DVD. The endogenous software availability variable is instrumented by various movie
characteristics. Our results indicate that a 1% increase in software availability raises demand for
hardware by 0.87%. Next, we estimate a software supply equation with the number of DVD titles
as the dependent variable. The coe¢ cient on the hardware installed base variable indicates the
other direction of the network e¤ect. As more DVD players are sold, more titles are released on
DVD.
If left to itself, a market of complementary goods can end up in an inferior equilibrium where the
hardware adoption rate and the software availability are lower than optimal. Our results show that
network e¤ects exist in the DVD market, leaving room for a negative externality of considerable
size. Without more information on software provision costs, we cannot calculate the optimal size of
the market. One thing we do is verify the value of integration to hardware rms. We simulate the
e¤ect of a price change while holding all future prices constant and compute the change in industry
revenue. These gures give us an idea of how much of the potential benets of the network e¤ect is
being missed by an oligopoly structure. According to our simulations, an increase in total industry
revenue can be realized when the price cut occurs at early periods. Consumer surplus also increases
as consumers enjoy increased software availability. These results indicate that price coordination
among hardware rms may not only increase the total revenue of the rms in the industry but
also the total gain to the society, although this conclusion should be taken carefully. At the new
equilibrium with an increase in software availability, hardware rms may charge higher prices.
Thus, the net change in consumer surplus cannot be determined without computing the set of new
equilibrium prices.
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1 Tables
Table 5.1. Nested Logit Regression of Hardware Demand
BASE IV (HWchar) IV ( HW/SW char)
PRICE -0.075(5.39)** -0.089(1.23) -0.299(3.23)**
log(N) 1.227(18.70)** 1.107(7.02)** 0.867(6.20)**
WITHIN 0.959(134.69)** 0.798(13.40)** 0.828(18.28)**
SEASON 1.168(62.74)** 1.102(32.93)** 1.129(41.60)**
COMP 0.080(1.74) 0.048(0.83) 0.162(1.87)
OPT -0.033(0.73) -0.159(1.67) -0.045(0.46)
COAX -0.025(0.63) -0.053(0.68) -0.017(0.26)
DD -0.042(1.38) -0.074(1.86) -0.085(1.31)
DTS 0.088(1.94) 0.003(0.04) 0.178(1.41)
CDR 0.142(2.88)** 0.151(1.73) 0.238(1.96)
MP3 0.123(5.29)** 0.266(2.67)* 0.093(0.80)
DVDR 0.028(0.96) 0.069(1.24) 0.096(1.89)
PROG 0.055(2.23)* -0.007(0.07) 0.162(1.68)
REC 0.746(3.57)** 1.298(2.57)* 1.445(4.36)**
PORT 0.232(2.54)* 0.074(0.31) 0.710(2.28)*
MULTI 0.123(5.17)** 0.075(1.28) 0.188(2.88)**
Constant -13.556(34.37)** -13.672(16.36)** -11.834(13.65)**
Observations 7392 7040 7040
R-squared 0.96 0.94 0.94
Robust t statistics clustered by brand in parentheses; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
The rst stage R2 is 0.88 for the rst IV regression, and 0.98 for the second.
Dependent variable is the di¤erence between log of market share of a product j and the outside option.
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Table 5.2. Own and Cross Price Elasticities of some products
PANASONIC DVDA100 SONY DVPNC600 VCR
PANASONIC DVDA100  0:89 0:0009 0:0028
SONY DVPNC600 0:0023  0:51 0:0028
VCR 0:000002 0:0001  0:26
Each entry corresponds to the percentage change in the market share of the model in the row with respect
to a 1% change in the price of the model in the column.
Table 5.3. Software Supply Equation Estimation Results
OLS IV
Installed Base 0.142 (0.04)** 0.136 (0.03)**
ln(DVD Movie)t 1 0.265 (0.12)* 0.279(0.11)*
Constant -0.025 (0.54) 0.022 (0.35)
DW statistic 1.91 1.95
Observations 72 72
R-squared 0.52 0.52
Autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in parentheses; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant
at 1%
Dependent variable is the log of monthly release of DVD movies.
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Appendix: Additional Tables
Table A.1. Description of Product Attributes
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev.
COMP Component video output 8814 0.742 0.438
OPT Optical digital audio output 8814 0.848 0.359
COAX Coaxial digital audio output 8814 0.785 0.411
DD Built-in Dolby Digital audio decoder 8742 0.300 0.458
DTS Built-in Digital Theater Systems (DTS) decoder 8742 0.119 0.324
CDR CD-R or/and CD-RW playable 8742 0.480 0.500
MP3 MP3 playable 8742 0.290 0.454
DVDR DVD-R, a DVD recording format, playable 8778 0.148 0.355
PROG Progressive scan 8778 0.209 0.406
REC Recorder 8814 0.013 0.112
PORT Portable 8814 0.078 0.269
MULTI Value is 1 if player has multiple disc changer. 8814 0.213 0.409
Note: All variables take the value of 1 if a player has that feature and 0 otherwise.
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Figure 1: Monthly sales of DVD players and VCRs
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Figure 2: Average prices of DVD players and VCRs
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Figure 3: Number of title releases
Figure 4: Size of Industry Revenue Change by the Timing of Price Cut
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